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ABSTRACT 
Are Product Innovation and Flexible Technology Complements? 
by Astrid Jung ∗ 
This paper revises the interdependence between flexible technology and product 
innovation in the context of a monopolistic firm. Previous literature argued that flexible 
machinery reduces the cost of incremental innovation. To take interactions beyond the 
fixed cost into account, we introduce a 2-period optimization model where technology, 
innovation and price are chosen first, then stochastic demand realizes and, finally, 
production is carried out. We find that flexibility increases the expected second period 
gain from incremental innovation in some but not all cases. Thus, the overall profit 
function need not be supermodular although fixed cost complementarity might be 
substantial.  Empirical evidence from the German mechanical engineering industry 
suggests that fixed costs complementarity indeed does not outweigh potential adverse 
effects in expected operational profits. 
 
 
Keywords: Supermodularity, flexible technology, product innovation, multi-product firms, 
demand uncertainty, capacity constraints 
JEL Classification: C25, D21, D92, L23 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Sind Produktinnovation und flexible Technologien komplementär? 
Der vorliegende Beitrag überprüft den Zusammenhang zwischen flexibler Technologie 
und Produktinnovation im Kontext des Monopols. Die bisherige Forschungsliteratur 
betonte die Eigenschaft flexibler Produktionstechnologie die Kosten für zusätzliche 
Innovation zu senken. Um Interaktionen über die Fixkosten hinaus zu berücksichtigen, 
analysieren wir ein Optimierungsmodell über zwei Perioden, in welchem zuerst die 
Technologie, Innovation und Preis gewählt werden, danach die stochastische Nachfrage 
eintritt und schließlich die Produktion stattfindet. Es zeigt sich, dass Flexibilität den 
erwarteten Gewinn der zweiten Periode aus zusätzlicher Innovation nicht immer 
steigert. Daher muss die Profitfunktion nicht notwendigerweise supermodular sein, 
selbst wenn die Komplementarität in den Fixkosten erheblich ist. Empirische Belege aus 
dem deutschen Maschinenbausektor weisen darauf hin, dass die 
Fixkostenkomplementarität tatsächlich nicht ausreicht um potentiell gegenläufige 
Effekte aus den erwarteten operativen Gewinnen zu kompensieren. 
                                                 
∗This paper greatly profited from discussions with Rabah Amir, Paul Heidhues, Daniel Krähmer, Lars-Hendrik Röller and 
Zhentang Zhang. I would also like to thank Jos Jansen, Rainer Schulz and workshop participants at the Humboldt University 
Berlin and the Free University Berlin for their useful comments. Funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (DFG) and 
the GAAC project Impediments to Innovation: A Complementarities Approach of the RTN program of the European 
Commission (HPRN-CT-2000-00061) is greatfully acknowledged. Remaining errors are mine. 
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1 Introduction
During the last three decades huge advances in (and decreasing prices of) information
technology (IT) have severely aﬀected manufacturing and revolutionized the Þrm at
the shop-ßoor level. This new technology does not only increase the speed and quality
of production, but is also capable to handle a greater variety of product designs at
lower costs. Simultaneously costumers have shown interest in commodities that Þt
their individual tastes and that oﬀer a better quality. The observation that higher
levels of IT reduce the cost of incremental product improvement suggests that the two
decision variables are complements. Complementarity in conjunction with parameters
in the Þrms environment shifting in a way that promotes either the adoption of high
performance technology or innovative activities, would lead to aﬃliation between the
technology mode and innovation in real business.
Beyond the descriptive aspect, complementarity opens an interesting path for in-
novation policy: if the goal were to stimulate product innovation this could be done
indirectly by giving incentives to adopt complementary technologies. Practically this
might be a promising approach because product innovation is diﬃcult to measure and
therefore diﬃcult to target. Moreover, the eﬃciency of policies aimed at promoting
innovation might be substantially enhanced by decreasing the obstacles to complemen-
tary practices.
Complementarity between ßexibility and innovation as it has been widely recognized
however, focuses entirely on how product innovation and ßexibility interact in the Þxed
costs. In this paper we take a further well-known property of ßexible machinery into
account which has not yet been related to product innovation: ßexibility provides a
hedge against uncertain future conditions. That is, investing in ßexibility today a Þrm
can increase discretion in later periods when it is better informed about its environment.
To relate this idea to product innovation and (product) ßexibility1, consider a company
1The paper excludes a discussion of process ßexibility and process innovation because neither
randomness of demand nor randomness of marginal costs would qualitatively change results derived
from Þxed costs only.
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with a Þxed number of products whose prices are announced in a catalogue. Often such
a catalogue is printed without information on what quantities costumers will eventually
order and hence production has to be adjusted according to incoming requests.
Because capacity is costly and Þxed in the short run Þrms are usually not prepared
to produce all possible quantity realizations. However, by adopting ßexible multi-
tasking technology that can produce a wide range of products, instead of machines
that are specialized in a few designs, a Þrm is more likely able to meet their costumers
demand with a given capacity. Abstracting from variable cost which might diﬀer across
technologies, expected proÞts in the production period will thus be higher for ßexible
technology. Moreover, due to imposing varying capacity constraints on production, the
level of ßexibility might aﬀect the probability that additional orders can be complied
with. The latter is especially important in the context of this paper as demand en-
hancing activities like product improvement will actually pay only if the production
capabilities of the Þrm accommodate induced quantity increments.
To formalize this intuition we build a two-period optimization model. First the
multi-product Þrm decides on whether technology should be dedicated or ßexible, what
capacity the machines shall accommodate, the level of product innovation and a price.
At this stage, only the distribution of demand conditional on price and innovation is
known and we assume that ßexible technology reduces the cost of incremental product
improvement. In the second period demand realizes and actual production is conducted
subject to demand and capacity constraints. In order to separate the insurance eﬀect
of ßexibility as clearly as possible we restrict the analysis to product markets with
identical characteristics and marginal costs that are constant, equal across products
and independent of technology. The only characteristic that distinguishes our multi-
variate setting from the notion of a single-product Þrm is the fact that stochastic
demand shocks are not perfectly correlated across products.
Our results are as follows. Production will on average be higher if technology
is ßexible, because then the capacity constraint applies to the sum of production of
variants, whereas dedicated technology imposes one capacity constraint for every single
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variant. However, the positive eﬀect of incremental product innovation on expected
operational proÞts (sales minus variable costs) is increasing in ßexibility only for a
limited range of capacity. This is because the probability that additional demand can
be complied with is not necessarily greater for ßexible technology. This ambiguity is
driven by the fact that the probability that additional demand can be complied with is
not necessarily greater for ßexible technology. Thus, ßexible technology may interact
positively or negatively with product innovation in the expected operational proÞts
function.
Without further and possibly unrealistic assumptions on the size of the eﬀects we
cannot rule out that a potential negative interaction in expected operational proÞts
might be greater than bilateral costs savings in the Þxed costs. Only in the limiting
case of our model, where the demand distribution is degenerate (i.e. there is no un-
certainty), complementarities in the Þxed costs and in the demand function lead to
complementarities in overall proÞts and allow unambiguous comparative statics pre-
dictions.
To check the empirical relevance of our model we analyze adoption decision of
532 plants of the German mechanical engineering industry in 1992 and 1994. If in-
deed complementarities stemming from bilateral Þxed cost savings were dominant, we
should expect the levels of product innovation and ßexibility to be aﬃliated in prac-
tice. The data reveals that indeed highly ßexible Þrms signiÞcantly tend to adopt more
product improvements. However, after controlling for observed heterogeneity aﬃliation
vanishes.
Our arguments shed some new light on the discussion of what Milgrom and Roberts
(19902 and 1995a) labelled modern manufacturing. These authors argue that a
paradigm shift in the organization and strategy of the Þrm replaced traditional mass
production of the type that had been characterizing manufacturing during the Þrst half
of the twentieth century. Their idea is that many features of production, like high skills,
2See also the comments on this article by Bushnell/Shepard (1995), Topkis (1995), and the reply
by Milgrom/Roberts (1995b) .
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worker involvement, frequent product improvement and ßexible machines complement
each other. Consequently, monotone shifts in complementary exogenous variables like
falling costs of ßexibility and communication due to the IT revolution and changes in
consumer demand not only favored investments in high capability technology and the
orientation towards diﬀerentiated product lines with frequent changes but also induced
adjustments in complementary variables. This work, however, focuses on Þxed costs
eﬀects and on properties of the deterministic demand function and does not explicitly
model randomness of demand.
This applies also to an article by Athey and Schmutzler (1995) who show that
complementarity between product and process innovation in the short run can induce
complementarity between long-run product and process ßexibility if each type of ßexi-
bility decreases the cost of the respective kind of innovation. They explicitly allow for
a random gain from ßexibility which aﬀects the proÞtability of the short run variables
but its realization does not impose any kind of restriction on the feasible choices. In
our model the gain from ßexibility stems from deviations of the realized demand of
diﬀerent products to opposite directions of their expectation because this determines
the extend to which ßexible capacity can be shifted among the products. From this
comparison it becomes evident that in our approach the realization of uncertain gains
from ßexibility imposes constraints on the set of feasible decisions (production) to be
taken thereafter, whereas it does not in the article of Athey and Schmutzler.
The way we understand gains from ßexibility  the Þrm invests in technology
under uncertainty, stochastic demand realizes and production levels are chosen  has
been modeled in a single-Þrm context by Fine and Freund (1990) who give necessary
and suﬃcient conditions to adopt ßexible machines. VanMieghem (1998) extended
this work by showing that ßexibility might pay also in situations where products are
perfectly correlated because it allows the order of production to be according to proÞt
margins when capacity is a binding constraint. Epstein (1980) and also He and Pindyck
(1992) discuss technology decisions in a framework where uncertainty is not entirely
resolved piecewise. Jones and Ostroy (1984) formalize the intuition that the value of a
4
ßexible option increases with uncertainty.3 DeGroote (1994) generalizes this result to
the notions of potentially multidimensional ßexibility and diversity. All these articles
abstract from competition on the product market.4
In our paper ßexibility will be exclusively deÞned as the capability of a production
technology to support a variety of products and designs. We ignore any dimension
of ßexibility that results from diﬀerences in variable costs (see Stigler (1939), Vives
(1989)). For a survey of diﬀerent notions of ßexibility used in the economics and
management science literature respectively see Carlsson (1989) and Gerwin (1993) .
The notion of complementary variables can be formalized by using the concept of
supermodular objective functions on lattices. It may be thought of as a generalization
of diﬀerentiable functions exhibiting positive cross partial derivatives.5 Monotone in-
creases in a parameter vector whose elements are all complementary to every decision
variable lead to monotone shifts of the set of maximizers of a supermodular function
as established by Topkis 1978 and generalized by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . This
monotonicity property suggests that given such nicely behaved parameter vector, one
should observe association between complementary decision variables in the data. The
limits of this approach are discussed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) and also
Athey and Stern (1998).
Although many empirical investigations have been carried out to test implications
and Þnd support for the idea of various aspects of modern manufacturing6 none has
3In an oligopoly context this intuition can be misleading as argued by Vives (1989). He shows
that more uncertainty that results from more variable beliefs may decrease the value of ßexibility due
to interaction in the market. Novshek and Thoman (1999) Þnd that even in monopolized markets
optimal ßexibility might be decreasing in uncertainty. However, in contrast to most of the literature
(including the present paper) where demand uncertainty is understood as variability in demand for
products at given prices, they deÞne uncertainty as variability in consumers types (tastes).
4Papers that investigate the impact of an endogenous degree of ßexibility on equilibria in oligopoly
games include Vives (1986), Vives (1989), Röller and Tombak (1990), Eaton and Schmitt (1994),
Norman and Thisse (1999).
5For a comprehensive overview see the book by Topkis (1998) and the citations therein.
6Examples for studies that assess human recource practices attributed to modern manufactur-
ing are Pil/MacDuﬃe (1996), Ichniowski/Shaw/Prennushi (1997) and Patibandla/Chandra (1998) .
Bresnahan/Brynjolfsson/Hitt (2001) and Parthasarthy/Sethi (1993) devote special attention to the
adoption decisions of high performance  and thus ßexible  technology. Evidence on what are comple-
mentary competences to innovation and whether product and process innovation are complementary
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explored whether the adoption of ßexible technology favors innovation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we Þrst introduce a theoretical model
where price announcements are followed by deterministic reactions of the market that
make subsequent quantity adjustments unnecessary. This model repeats the reasoning
stated in previous literature that Þxed costs savings from the joint adoption of practices
in conjunction with a supermodular demand function lead to a proÞt function that is
supermodular in all decision variables. We then extend this model to situations where
demand is uncertain and quantity adjustments follow earlier price announcements.
Because the structure of the Þxed costs are unaﬀected by this change, we will focus
on insights at the operational proÞts level (sales minus marginal costs). Section 3
provides some empirical evidence from adoption decisions in manufacturing. Section 4
concludes.
2 A Model of the Firm
2.1 Model with Deterministic Demand
For later comparisons we will present a non-stochastic version of our model, that in-
volves the decision on ßexibility of machinery f , product innovation i, capacity k and
price p. Throughout the paper f is assumed to be binary, a value equal to 1 indicating
adoption of ßexible technology. Some of the deÞnitions and results that are heavily
used in what follows are listed in appendix A.
Assume a 2-product Þrm acting as a monopolist. For simplicity we consider marginal
costs c of production that are constant and equal across products and let the product
markets be identical in their demand characteristics.7 Due to this simpliÞcations op-
timal prices as well as optimal capacities must be the same for both products and we
therefore can fully describe the Þrms price and capacity choices with scalars p and k.
can be found in Leiponen (2000) and Miravete/Pernias (2000) respectively.
7For the discussion of the deterministic demand model we could (without loss) treat the two
products as one. A distinction between two products is made only for the sake of consistency with
the stochastic version of the model.
6
Let innovation be an eﬀort that keeps the number of products constant and equally
improves the quality of both products. Consumers demand for each product j = 1, 2
can then be denoted by Dj = Dj(i, p) which we assume to be diﬀerentiable in i and p
with ∂Dj/∂p ≤ 0 and ∂Dj/∂i ≥ 0 and further, supermodular in (i, p).8
Supermodularity of the demand function implies that a price increase will diminish
the demanded quantity weakly less if product innovation eﬀorts are high. Super-
modularity of the demand function in conjunction with the assumed directions of the
Þrst derivatives implies that the price elasticity of demand (−∂Dj
∂p
p
Dj
) is decreasing
in innovation.9 Hence, the more a Þrm improves its products the less sensitive con-
sumers will be to price changes. Total demand for the Þrms products will be denoted
D := D(i, p) = 2Dj(i, p). This leads to the operational proÞt function
eΠ(i, p) = (p− c)D(i, p). (1)
Total proÞts Π equal the operational proÞts minus Þxed cost. As is argued by Milgrom
and Roberts (1995a), the Þxed costs may be characterized by cost savings from the
joint adoption of practices in the sense that implementing a higher level of one decision
variable gets cheaper at high values of another decision variable. In what follows we
repeat the rationale stated by Milgrom and Roberts for savings in the costs of increased
product innovation due to a high degree of ßexibility.
The Þxed costs consist of three components: the cost of capacity γk with γ Þxed and
independent of technology, the cost of ßexibility F and the cost of product innovation
I. We say a Þrm operates under the ßexible technology scheme if it can operate all
products on a single machine whereas with dedicated technology it needs to possess
one machine per product. If the Þrm invests in ßexible technology it will incur a cost
8Although we do neither need diﬀerentiability nor the cardinal concept of complementarity to
assess comparative statics we use the Þrst for its intuitive appeal and the latter because it is easier
to verify in the context of the stochastic version of our model. But even under these more restrictive
assumptions the stochastic version of the model will be shown to fail the monotonicity property.
9A price elasticity that is decreasing in i is equivalent to the log of the demand function being
supermodular, or in diﬀerent words, the demand function is then log-supermodular. This property is
suﬃcient for monotone comparative statics of (p−c)Dj(i, p) and less demanding thanDj supermodular
and increasing in i but more diﬃcult to handle once demand is stochastic.
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F = F (f,ω) which depends on a vector of exogenous variables ω and is zero for f = 0.
Note that in the current setting a Þrm can never be better oﬀ by investing in both
types of machines instead of installing only one kind.10
The assumptions on the cost of technology are motivated by the fact that IT,
which makes machines ßexible, has become relatively cheap. Thus, most of the cost
diﬀerence between ßexible and dedicated equipment can be attributed to relatively
more expensive adoption (e.g. coordination costs, speciÞc training, need for high skilled
operators).
We take the cost of product innovations I to depend on the decision variables i
and f and on a parameter vector ω. Product improvements are less costly if they
do not require extensive reconÞguration of the production process or extra machinery,
i.e. if technology is ßexible enough to accommodate changes easily. This suggests
complementarity between i and f with respect to (−I). Hence, we assume that (−I)
is supermodular in (i, f).
Summarizing the preceding paragraphs, the Þrms proÞt can be written as
Π := Π(i, f, k, p,ω) = (p− c)D(i, p)− γk − F (f,ω)− I(i, f,ω). (2)
We are now ready to state the Þrst proposition that derives interactions of the decision
variables in the overall proÞt function from their interactions on either the demand or
the Þxed cost.
Proposition 1 Consider the proÞt function in (2) with (i, f, k, p)T ∈ R+ × {0, 1} ×
R+ × R+p≥c.Let ω be an element of the partially ordered set Ω. Suppose that Dj(i, p)
for j = 1, 2 is diﬀerentiable and supermodular in (i, p) and increasing in i; −I(i, f,ω)
is supermodular in (i, f) and has increasing diﬀerences in ((i, f),ω) and −F (f,ω) has
increasing diﬀerences in (f,ω). Then
(i) Π is supermodular in (i, f, k, p).
10VanMieghem (1998) allows marginal capacity costs to vary with technology and discusses condi-
tions under which Þrms Þnd it optimal to invest in both, dedicated and ßexible technology.
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(ii) argmaxi,f,k,pΠ is increasing in ω.
Proof. See appendix B.
As a consequence of proposition 1 we should observe a clustering in the choice of
i, f, k and p if the components of ω are associated (i.e. shifts in ω are monotone) and we
have controlled for the Þxed parameters γ, c and for further individual heterogeneity.
Under these circumstances, Þrms that invest a lot in product improvements will tend
to have adopted ßexible technology and high prices and vice versa. The monotonicity
predicts that Þrms adjust to changes in parameters which complement all endogenous
variables in a coherent fashion, that is, by weakly increasing the level of all decision
variables. A complementary parameter to our decision problem could be the skills of
potential employees, because high skill levels can be assumed to reduce the cost of
adopting ßexible technology and make product innovation easier. Another example
might be (the negative of) the cost of IT: low IT costs make it more attractive to
switch production to the ßexible, IT controlled mode (computer aided manufacturing
 CAM) and decrease the cost of experimenting with design changes (computer aided
design  CAD).
It should be pointed out that, so far, there is no reason to assume a diﬀerentiable
demand function. Limiting the variability of i and p to discrete changes would aﬀect
the proof but none of the implications of proposition 1.11
Note further, that we have established supermodularity in k, too. However, as
capacity does not interact at all with any other decision variable of our model, su-
permodularity in k is only weak and neither a strictly positive nor a strictly negative
association between k and any other decision variable is predicted. The reason why we
have included capacity choice in our model so far is that doing so will be natural in
the context of the stochastic model below.
11For the proof without diﬀerentiability see Topkis (1998), theorem 3.3.3.
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2.2 Two-period Model of the Firm with Stochastic Demand
The key feature of the elaborate version of our model12 is that given price and innova-
tion we allow for two realizations of demand for each product j = 1, 2:
Dj := Dj(i, p) =
½
D := D(i, p)
D := D(i, p)
j = 1, 2.
where D ≤ D for each given i and p. We denote the probability that the demand
conditional on i and p equals the lower value D with δ0. The joint density function of
the identically distributed random variables D1 and D2 is fully determined by four free
parameters: δ0, the expectation and standard deviation of the marginal distributions
µ := E[Dj] and σ := var[Dj ] and the correlation coeﬃcient ρ. We will assume that
expected demand is a function of price and innovation, µ = µ(i, p) whereas the un-
certainty parameter σ is not aﬀected by these variables. Changes in price or the level
of product innovation will thus shift the probability function along the horizontal axis
maintaining its shape.
Imposing random realizations instead of deterministic demand allows us to analyze
a key property of ßexible technology, namely its capability to shift capacity among
products13. Clearly, if there is no uncertainty this can hardly be an advantage compared
to dedicated technology. Total capacity would then be chosen to equal the demand
for all products. With uncertainty a Þrm can only make use of capacity shifting, if
they can adjust production after demand has realized. This suggests to split the Þrms
decision into two periods as has been done by VanMieghem (1998): in the Þrst period
demand will be uncertain and the Þrm decides on the level of i, f , k and p. Then
demand realizes and actual production y = (y1 y1)T is chosen. Note that no direction
of the correlation between the demand shocks is primarily assumed, thus we incorporate
situations where the interdependence of the product demands is mostly inßuenced by
macro shocks (like one that increases income of the whole economy) as well as settings
12To safe notation, functions in the current model are named in the same way as in section 2.
13Throughout we will ignore the quantitative dimension of ßexibility and rather treat the capacity
as a generally binding constraint to production. This is, we assume marginal cost of production being
inÞnite above the capacity level.
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where these macro shocks are outweighed by omitted demand drivers that hit the two
markets diﬀerently.
Firms are risk neutral and hence they maximize expected proÞts
EΠ : = EΠ(i, f, k, p, y, δ0,σ, ρ,ω) = EeΠ(D(i, p, δ0, σ, ρ), f, k, y, c)
−I(i, f,ω)− γk − F (f,ω), (3)
with c and γ Þxed as above and variable parameters δ0, σ, ρ and the vector of omitted
exogenous variables ω.
After demand has realized, the Þrm faces the optimization problem
max
y
(p− c)
X
yj (4)
s.t. yj ≤ 1
2
k if f = 0,P
yj ≤ k if f = 1,
yj ≤ Dj.
It is quite intuitive, that for a given k the capacity constraint is less likely to be binding
in the ßexibility case because then every capacity unit is multifunctional. Optimal
values of production are in either case straightforward: if technology is dedicated (f =
0), the optimization is done for each product independently. The Þrm will for each
j = 1, 2 produce the minimum of the demand Dj and the capacity 12k. In the case
of f = 1, optimization is done simultaneously for both products. Total production
will then equal the minimum of total demand ΣDj and total capacity k. This rule
unambiguously determines the levels of yj. Expected operational proÞts including
second period maximization are thus
EeΠ∗y := Emax
y
eΠ = ½ (p− c)PEmin(Dj, 12k)
(p− c)Emin (ΣDj, k) for
f = 0
f = 1
. (5)
Given capacity and realized demand, the optimal quantity vector is not inßuenced by
any parameters. As a consequence, if we want to assess comparative statics of our
model it comes without loss of information and is thus suﬃcient to consider the proÞt
function where quantity is already maximized for.
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Equation (5) can be rewritten as
EeΠ∗y = ½ (p− c) {2E [Dj|Ξ0] Pr (Ξ0) + k [1− Pr (Ξ0)]}(p− c) {2E [Dj|Ξ1] Pr (Ξ1) + k [1− Pr (Ξ1)]} for f = 0f = 1 , (6)
where Ξ0 and Ξ1 denote the events of having demand as the only binding constraint,
that is, Dj < 12k and ΣDj < k respectively.
Equation (6) does not involve any distributional assumption so far. However, in-
spection of the second line reveals what diﬃculties would be involved by assuming some
general distribution for demand: given we know the marginal distribution of Dj there
are no general results concerning the distribution of the sum of such random variables
even if they are identically distributed14. Even worse, we do not know whether the
marginal distribution of Dj conditional on Ξ1 behaves nicely, namely, whether it has
an expectation. And although we can give an explicit formula15 for the probability of
Ξ1 this will not be diﬀerentiable in the demand shifters i and p even if distributions
are continuous. It is for these reasons that we apply a two-dimensional two-point dis-
tribution and thus stick to the simplest possible model of random demand. By doing
so we can easily compute the joint and conditional marginal distributions and identify
regions in which diﬀerentiability is ensured.
Using the deÞnitions of mean, variance, correlation and marginal probabilities it is
straightforward to derive the joint probabilities δ00 = ρ (δ0−δ20)+δ20, δ11 = δ00+1−2δ0
and δ10 = δ01 = δ0 − δ00 with the j-th index equal to zero if Dj = D and equal to
one for Dj = D (j = 1, 2). Note, that by deÞnition δ00 ∈ [0, δ0]. Table 1 displays
the probability that demand is binding and, given it is, the expected demand in the
respective settings for dedicated and ßexible technology.
14Remember that although the random variables are identically distributed we want to allow for
correlation between them.
15For two continuous random variables x and y with joint density h on support [a, b]2 we have
Pr[x+ y ≤ k] =
cZ
a
dZ
a
h(x, y)dxdy
with c = min(k − a, b) and d = max(a,min(k − y, b)).
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case condition Pr (Ξ0) E [Dj |Ξ0] Pr (Ξ1) E [Dj |Ξ1]
I k ≤ 2D 0 / 0 /
IIa
IIb
2D < k ≤ D +D
D+D < k ≤ 2D δ0 D
δ00
1− δ11
D
D δ001−δ11 +
1
2
¡
D+D
¢
2δ10
1−δ11
III 2D < k 1 µ 1 µ
Table 1: Probability that demand is a binding constraint to production and expected
demand given demand is binding.
Plugging the results from table 1 into equation (6) leads to
EeΠ∗y(f = 0) =
 (p− c) k(p− c) [2δ0D + (1− δ0) k]
(p− c) 2µ
for
I
IIa,b
III
,
EeΠ∗y(f = 1) =

(p− c) k
(p− c) [2δ00D + (1− δ00) k]
(p− c) £2 ¡δ0D + (δ0 − δ00)D¢+ (1− 2δ0 + δ00) k¤
(p− c) 2µ
for
I
IIa
IIb
III
.
(7)
Although the function EeΠ∗y is not diﬀerentiable over its entire range it is continuous
as can be checked by plugging in the case boundary conditions.
Note, that given positive costs of increasing capacity and product improvement
eﬀorts, no proÞt maximum would ever involve capacity and product innovation and
price such that k lies outside
£
2D, 2D
¤
, the support of ΣDj and 2Dj. If there were an
optimal decision leading to k < 2D, the Þrm could decrease its product improvement
eﬀorts or increase the price of the products without aﬀecting production, because
capacity is a binding constraint to production with probability one. Similarly, 2D <
k cannot be optimal, because the Þrm could save capacity costs without decreasing
revenues. Keeping this in mind we will focus on cases IIa and IIb for further discussion
although all statements to appear below apply equally  at least in a qualitative way
 to cases outside this range16.
16The case k = 2D should, of course, not be excluded. For the sake of calculating EeΠ∗y it can be
incorporated into the case 2D < k ≤ D+D because EeΠ∗y is continuous.
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2.3 Analysis of the Extended Model
We proceed by analyzing the impact of the endogenous variables on the expected proÞt
function (7) and derive thereafter whether they are complements. The key question is
how the presence of technology dependent constraints to production alters the incen-
tives to invest into additional capacity and product innovation.
Our strategy to derive whether the decision variables i, f , k and p are complements
is to check their interactions in each part of the proÞt function and then use the
summation property of supermodular functions. Complementarities in the Þxed costs
are assumed to exist as in the preceding section. Because the set of feasible actions is a
Þnite product of chains in our model it suﬃces to establish pairwise complementarity.
Hence, the proÞt function is supermodular if and only if it is supermodular in any
subset of decision variables.
First order eﬀects are discussed in the beginning because they reveal important
properties of the model which are helpful for the understanding of the interaction
results.
The expected gain in operational proÞts from using ßexible versus dedicated ma-
chines is the diﬀerence
EeΠ∗y(f = 1)− EeΠ∗y(f = 0) =

0
(p− c) (δ0 − δ00) (k − 2D)
−(p− c) (δ0 − δ00)
¡
k − 2D¢
0
for
I
IIa
IIb
III
. (8)
Retrieving that the joint probability δ00 cannot be greater than the marginal probability
δ0 and using further 2D < k ≤ D+D in the second and D+D < k ≤ 2D in the third
line of equation (8), it can easily be seen that EeΠ∗y(f = 1) − EeΠ∗y(f = 0) ≥ 0. This
leads to our Þrst lemma:
Lemma 1 Using ßexible instead of dedicated technology cannot lead to lower proÞts in
the production period.
The superiority of ßexibility in the production period reveals clearly that our model
captures the idea of using ßexibility as a hedge against risky demand as stressed in
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the introduction. We would also expect that the higher uncertainty about demand 
i.e. the greater the standard deviation σ in our model  the higher the expected gain
from operating under the ßexibility scheme. To check this, we want to vary D and D
in a way that keeps the mean but not the variance constant. Solving the deÞnitions of
µ and σ for the upper and lower realization and using that D ≤ D of demand yields
D = µ− σ
r
1− δ0
δ0
and D = µ+ σ
r
δ0
1− δ0 . (9)
Inserting (9) into (8) above reveals that EeΠ∗y(f = 1)−EeΠ∗y(f = 0) is indeed increasing
in σ.
The notion of ßexibility in this paper suggests further, that the more positively
correlated demands of the two products are (and thus, the greater δ00 and δ11 for
a given marginal probability δ0), the scarcer the situations in which ßexible Þrms
can shift capacity between the products. This can be seen to hold in our model as
EeΠ∗y(f = 1) − EeΠ∗y(f = 0) is decreasing in δ00. Because neither σ nor ρ aﬀects the
Þxed costs their inßuence on the proÞtability of ßexible technology at the production
stage directly translates to overall proÞts as stated in lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The gain from ßexibility is nondecreasing in demand risk and nonincreasing
in demand correlation.
Before we discuss how decision variables other than f aﬀect proÞts a few remarks
on the demand shifters i and p are in order. Throughout the paper we assumed that
demand is supermodular in price and innovation. In the current context we thus have
∂2D/∂i∂p ≥ 0 and ∂2D/∂i∂p ≥ 0 but neither the direct eﬀect of i and p nor the cross
partials need to be of the same magnitude for the upper and lower demand realization
to ensure that also expected demand is supermodular in i and p. However, in order to
separate changes in proÞts due to variation in µ from those due to variance shifts it is
useful to assume that marginal eﬀects on D and D are of the same size and thus equal
to dµ, such that σ remains at its initial value.
Intuitively, the impact of intensiÞed innovation or enlarged capacity on expected
operational proÞts consists of two eﬀects. First, there is an upward shift in expected
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production due to either higher expected demand or enhanced capability. Second, the
probability that demand is a binding constraint to production will change at the case
boundaries. From (7) it is easily seen that EeΠ∗y is upward sloping with respect to i
and k.
Figure 1 shows for the case with ßexible technology how the magnitude of the
change of EeΠ∗y in µ and k depends on the size of k compared to µ. The eﬀect of
changes in demand is positive and greater in magnitude for high values of (k − 2µ).
This is consistent with intuition because more slack capacity will better accommodate
additional demand. Accordingly, intuition suggest, that the operational gain from
additional capacity should be decreasing in slack capacity (k − 2µ), because capacity
is then less often needed to comply with demand. This can be seen from Þgure 1 to
hold in our model.
A price increase aﬀects expected operational proÞts in two ways. It reduces expected
demand but on the other side it boosts operational proÞts from every item that is Þnally
produced. The latter results in an upward shift of the graphs in Þgure 1. Without
further assumptions on the magnitude of this demand eﬀect, on σ and on ρ the price
eﬀect is not determined in sign. Lemma 3 summarizes the results on the Þrst-order
eﬀects of i, k and p.
Lemma 3 Expected operational proÞts (EeΠ∗y) are nondecreasing in product innovation
and capacity and increasing or decreasing or non-monotone in price. Gains from prod-
uct innovation are nondecreasing in slack capacity (k− 2µ), whereas expected revenues
from additional capacity are nonincreasing in k − 2µ.
To check whether EeΠ∗y exhibits complementarity in f , i, k and p we will now discuss
how each of these variables changes the Þrst order eﬀect of the remaining decision
variables. By inserting (9) into the operational proÞts in (7) and using ∂2µ/∂i∂p ≥ 0
and ∂µ/∂i ≥ 0 it is straightforward to see that ∂2EeΠ∗y/∂i∂p ≥ 0 where it exists.
The upper graph in Þgure 1 illustrates that indeed the complementarity relationship
between i and p in the expectation of demand is translated into complementarity in
16
the function EeΠ∗y, over the whole range of its support. Note, that a price increase leads
to a rightward shift on the abscissa (µ is decreasing in p) and shifts the graph upwards.
Intuitively, because µ is supermodular in i and p, an increase in price always boosts
the demand gain from improving products and also (at the boundaries indicated in the
graph) the probability that the additional demand can be produced and, eventually,
the net proÞt from producing an item.
From the lower graph in Þgure 1 we see that a higher price (i.e. lower µ) decreases
the probability that additional capacity is used in production once the case boundaries
are passed. However, there is also a potential for p interacting positively with k,
because, whenever additional capacity is used, it pays more when price is high. Thus,
a higher price would lead to an upward shift of the graph. Without further assumptions
the net eﬀect of price on marginal changes of capacity is undetermined.
Lemma 4 summarizes the interactions of k and i with price.
Lemma 4 The gain in expected operational proÞts due to a higher level of product
innovation is nondecreasing in price (∂
2EeΠ∗y
∂i∂p
≥ 0). The eﬀect of a price increase on the
expected operational gain from additional capacity is undetermined (∂
2EeΠ∗y
∂k∂p
Q 0).
We argued above that, as long as product demands are not perfectly positively cor-
related, there is a potential gain from being able to shift capacity among the products,
i.e., EeΠ∗y(f = 1) − EeΠ∗y(f = 0) cannot be negative. But how is this gain inßuenced
by other decisions of the Þrm? Figure 2 displays the gain in operational proÞts from
ßexible machinery as a function of expected demand and capacity. Using that higher
innovative activity would shift µ to the right, the ßexibility gain is increasing in µ and
thus in i at low values of µ (case IIb, holding capacity constant) and decreasing for
high values (case IIa). Thus, neither (f, i) nor (f,−i) are complements in the func-
tion EeΠ∗y. This is not a surprise: remember that the marginal eﬀect of µ is simply
(p − c) Pr(Ξ0) for dedicated and (p − c) Pr(Ξ1) for ßexible technology because within
the case boundaries demand changes leave the probability that demand is a binding
constraint constant. From the discussion of table 1 we know that Pr(Ξ0) ≥ Pr(Ξ1) in
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case IIa and Pr(Ξ0) ≤ Pr(Ξ1) in case IIb.
The fact that the probability that demand is binding is not strictly greater for one of
the two technologies is not a result of the distributional assumption we made here. To
see this, recall Pr (Ξ0) = Pr
¡
Dj <
1
2
k
¢
= Pr (2Dj < k) and Pr (Ξ1) = Pr (ΣDj < k).
Irrespective of the distribution of Dj the random variables 2Dj and ΣDj are deÞned
on support [2D, 2D], have the same mean, but var(2Dj) ≥ var (ΣDj). Let the distri-
butions of 2Dj and ΣDj be G and H respectively. For some small value ε we have
G(2D + ε) ≥ H(2D + ε) and
G(2D − ε) ≤ H(2D − ε),
because for the sum to realize some value in the interval [2D; 2D + ε] it takes both
random variables Dj, j = 1, 2 to realize very close to the lower bound, which cannot
happen with greater probability than the event that the realization of a single Dj is
near D. Equivalently, ΣDj will less frequently be close to the upper bound of the
support than 2Dj.
Given this very general property which equally applies to settings with more than
two products, we must have some region of the support where Pr (Ξ0) ≥ Pr (Ξ1) and
also some region where Pr (Ξ0) ≤ Pr (Ξ1). As a consequence, within the regions where
Pr (Ξ0) and Pr (Ξ1) do not react to changes of demand, the interaction between innova-
tion and ßexibility in operational proÞts equals (p− c)2∂µ
∂i
[Pr (Ξ1)− Pr (Ξ0)] and that
between capacity and ßexibility equals (p− c) [Pr (Ξ0)− Pr (Ξ1)]. Each of these terms
will be positive for some cases and negative for others, irrespective of the distribution
of Dj.17
The result that neither (f, i) fail to be complements in the function EeΠ∗y can be
understood intuitively by comparing the gains from innovation across the two techno-
logical regimes: For small changes (i.e. within the boundaries of the cases above) the
17At this point it should be repeated, that the analysis could not be done for general continuous
distributions due to the diﬃculties involved with diﬀerentiating the marginal expectation given a
constraint on the sum of dependent random variables. Of course, the statements about whether
Pr(Ξ0) exceeds Pr(Ξ1) remain true in the continuous case.
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shift in expected production given that demand is the binding constraint is invariant
to ßexibility such that it is suﬃcient to compare the probability that demand is actu-
ally constraining production (i.e. the probability that innovation actually results in a
sales boost). The fact that the probability of the sum has less probability weight on
the tails than the expanded marginal distribution translates into a relatively smaller
probability that demand is binding for ßexible technology if k is suﬃciently small. If k
is suﬃciently large, it is less likely for total demand than the expanded single demand
to be even greater than k and thus the expected gain from innovation will be greater
for ßexible technology.
Note that, whenever ßexibility increases the returns (in terms of EeΠ∗y) from higher
innovation it must decrease the gains from extra capacity, as the capacity and demand
constraints are binding with complementary probabilities. This can easily be veriÞed
in Þgure 2. Lemma 5 states our results on how the choice of the technology type aﬀects
gains from additional capacity and innovative eﬀorts at the production stage.
Lemma 5 Operational gains from product innovation are nonincreasing (nondecreas-
ing) in the degree of technological ßexibility for low (high) values of k−2µ. The marginal
eﬀect of capacity, is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in the degree of technological ßex-
ibility for low (high) values of k − 2µ. Furthermore, whenever ßexibility with respect
to operational proÞts EeΠ∗y is a complement to product innovation it is a substitute
to capacity and vice versa. For any number of products whose demand conditional on
price and innovation is a random draw from the same discrete marginal distribution we
have that ßexibility complements capacity (product innovation) but substitutes product
innovation (capacity) at suﬃciently low (high) values of k − 2µ.
Again, the price eﬀect on EeΠ∗y(f = 1)−EeΠ∗y(f = 0) is more diﬃcult to determine.
As a higher price decreases demand its eﬀect on the ßexibility gain should be opposite
to that of a higher level of innovation. But, unlike in the case of changing i, price has
also an eﬀect on the slope of the graph: if the probability of the constraints Ξ0 and Ξ1
remains unchanged (i.e. within the cases IIa and IIb) a higher price increases the per
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Â i p k f
i Â + + −
+
p Â ? +
?
k Â +−
Table 2: Bilateral interactions in EeΠ∗y.
unit value of ßexible technology. In sum, as stated in lemma 6, the eﬀect of price on
EeΠ∗y(f = 1)− EeΠ∗y(f = 0) is nonnegative at D +D > k (case IIa) and undetermined
elsewhere.
Lemma 6 With respect to expected operational proÞts (EeΠ∗y) ßexible technology and
price are complementary for small values of (k − 2µ). Outside this range their inter-
action is undetermined.
The discussion of Þgure 2 reveals the advantage of assuming diﬀerentiability of ex-
pected operational proÞts in i, p and k: allowing for discrete changes in these variables
would lead to the possibility of switching between cases IIa and IIb and hence, further
complicate the discussion. In a qualitative sense, however, our results would remain
unchanged.
We summarize our results visually in table 2. The signs + and - denote re-
spectively a nonnegative and a nonpositive interaction of two decision variables with
respect to EeΠ∗y, the question mark stands for interactions that we cannot derive in
their sign. In cases where one sign does not apply to the whole range of the support
the upper value is valid for D +D ≥ k and the lower for D +D ≤ k.
As becomes evident from table 2, EeΠ∗y is not supermodular in (i, f, k, p), because
irrespective of assumptions that can be made to determine missing bilateral interactions
and of the optimal values of k, D and D there is no unique direction of the interactions.
Note, that given linear capacity costs as we have assumed so far, there is no in-
teraction of f and k in the Þxed costs that could outweigh their potential negative
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interaction in the expected operational proÞts EeΠ∗y. Taking the Þxed costs into ac-
count will also not help to overcome the ambiguities of table 2 where price is involved.
A potential negative interaction between innovation and ßexibility, however, might be
overcompensated by Þxed cost savings of their joint adoption.
Proposition 2 summarizes the results from the discussion of the stochastic model.
Proposition 2 Consider the function of expected proÞts EΠ in (3) and the second
period optimization problem (4) with (i, f, k, p)T ∈ R+ × {0, 1} ×R+ ×R+p≥c. Suppose
that Dj(i, p) for j = 1, 2 is diﬀerentiable and supermodular in (i, p) and increasing in
i; −I(i, f,ω) is supermodular in (i, f). Then the following holds with respect to the
function EΠ
(i) i and p are complements.
(ii) i and k are complements.
(iii) f and k are neither complements nor substitutes.
(iv) i and f , f and p as well as k and p might be complements or substitutes or
neither.
(v) i and f are complements if their complementarity with respect to −I(i, f,ω) is
suﬃciently strong.
Proof. Follows directly from lemmas (3)-(6) and the summation property.
The analysis in this paragraph illustrates that the slight change in the model struc-
ture due to the introduction of uncertainty of demand has a substantial impact on
complementarity even though uncertainty was set up in a way that conditions for op-
timality in the extended model converge for suﬃciently small uncertainty to those of
the basic model in section 2.1.18 Thus, the limiting case of the stochastic model indeed
18To derive this recall that any optimally chosen capacity, price and innovation eﬀort must ensure
k ∈ £2D, 2D¤. If the risk approaches zero (D −D → 0) we must have k → S for optimality. Or, in
words, maximizing behavior under certainty allows for neither capacity nor demand slack.
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leads to an overall proÞt function that is supermodular as proposed by existing litera-
ture. However, the slightest demand uncertainty destroys the system of complementary
decision variables.
Although the decision variables of our model fail to be complements, they could
still meet the conditions of the monotonicity theorem in appendix A. To have a set of
maximizers that is increasing in complementary parameters the payoﬀ function only
needs to satisfy the weaker concept of quasisupermodularity. Quasisupermodularity is
more demanding to check (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) for details). However, with
diﬀerentiability we can investigate whether, as a direct consequence of the monotonicity
property, all Þrst order conditions are nondecreasing in all other decision variables.
This is done by plugging in as many FOCs as necessary for sign determination into
a given cross partial of the proÞt function. In our model this procedure does not
lead to any new information. Hence, without further assumptions on the strength of
interactions in Þxed costs and operational proÞts we cannot conclude that increases
in parameter values that lead to the adoption of ßexible technology would eventually
stimulate product innovation.
This means for example, that even though price and innovation have a positive
direct interaction, they may shift to opposite directions after monotonic parameter
shifts. To see this, consider an example where for the optimal decision of Þrm 1 we
have D +D > k (case IIa) and f = 1. Another Þrm faces lower product improvement
costs and might therefore opt to engage more in innovation than Þrm 1. This will in
turn make higher prices more proÞtable than for Þrm 1, but additionally shrinks the
expected gain from ßexible technology. If, as a result, f = 0, a lower price compared
to Þrm 1 might be optimal.
What we can actually gain from comparative statics reasoning is some economic
interpretation of the relationship between innovation and ßexibility: Imagine extra
capacity is suﬃciently cheap but not without cost (i.e. γ is small but greater than
zero), such that in optimum a Þrm will have a high capacity compared to expected de-
mand. Hence, it will rarely face situations were demand cannot be met due to capacity
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restrictions. Then a change in exogenous variables that promotes the adoption of ßex-
ible technology will also unambiguously shift the optimal level of product innovation
upwards, because at a suﬃciently large k relative to µ the probability that addition-
ally generated demand can be complied with is larger for ßexible than for dedicated
technology. On the other hand, high values of γ might induce the capacity constraint
to be frequently binding and therefore lead to the case were a negative interaction
between product innovation and ßexible technology at the production stage outweighs
their Þxed costs complementarity. Note however: if γ converges to zero, the incentive
to invest into the more expensive ßexible technology vanishes, as the Þrm can then
aﬀord to buy a lot of dedicated machines  although it will almost never fully employ
it  and therefore cannot gain from the capacity shifting a ßexible technology would
allow for.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Methodology
Before specifying estimation equations some remarks on measuring complementarity
among variables are in order. The attempts to test for complementarity conducted
by the literature follow two main directions. The Þrst alternative is to estimate the
decision makers objective function19. If the decision variables are indeed complements,
their interaction terms in the objective function should be positive and signiÞcant. This
approach can in principle give very useful understanding of how strong the interaction
between endogenous variables is. However, one needs to know what exactly decision
makers maximize which is not necessarily proÞts in case of Þrms. Even if one beliefs
to know this, it might turn out to be very diﬃcult or impossible to get data on the
objective.
19Examples for empirical studies following this approach include Bresnahan/Brynjolfsson/Hitt
(2001), Ichniowski/Shaw/Prennushi (1997), Leiponen (2000), Parthasarthy/Sethi (1993) and Pat-
ibandla/Chandra (1998). Beresteanu (2000) introduces nonparametric techniques for the estimation
of supermodular objective functions.
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The second approach taken in the literature20 builds on implications of Topkis
(1978) monotonicity theorem: given a system of complementary decision variables and
a vector of complementary parameters that are exogenous to the optimization problem,
monotone shifts in the parameter vector imply monotone reactions of the set of argu-
ments that maximize the objective. Empirically the requirement of monotone shifts
means that variables should be correlated, or, more generally, associated21 (Holmstrom
and Milgrom 1994). Thus, complementary practices are expected to be associated (un-
conditional association). Of course, in real life problems, parameters might not move
monotonically and there are often relevant exogenous variables which are not comple-
mentary to all endogenous variables. In this case, one must control for these potentially
troublesome variables and test for dependence in the residuals (conditional association).
The association approach has the advantage that researchers do not need to know
what the objectives of the decision makers are and with what functional form it can
be approximated. The cost for the less demanding data requirements is that the es-
timation will not give indications of the direct eﬀect of the decision variables on the
objective. Further, strong positive association between decision variables (or between
their residuals if some variables are controlled for) may not be interpreted as partic-
ularly strong complementarity as part of it may be due to association in the driving
exogenous variables that were not controlled for. We might even Þnd positive associa-
tion between the decision variables when they are in fact not complementary. However,
Athey and Stern (1998) show that the tendency to overestimate complementarity if un-
observed exogenous variables are associated is also a problem in the approach where
the objective function is estimated22.
One attempt to deal with unobserved heterogeneity is proposed by Miravete and
Pernias (2000) who estimate a system of decision variables with random eﬀects using
panel data. They consider the association between the purely random components
20Arora/Gambardella (1990) and Miravete/Pernias (2000) are examples for this approach.
21Association is preserved by monotone transformations of the random variables whereas correlation
is not.
22Part of their Þndings coincide with Arora (1996) .
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of the reduced-form residuals (error term minus the idiosyncratic component) as the
relevant indicator of complementarity23. Athey and Stern (1998) propose a method
to overcome the unobserved-heterogeneity problem in the context of cross sectional
data. It relies on the estimation of the objective function and can only be used with
extremely rich data.
In this paper we follow the association approach on the basis of reduced-form adop-
tion equations for ßexible technology and product innovation. We estimate both equa-
tions separately and allow for random eﬀects to take unobserved heterogeneity into ac-
count. This method provides consistent reduced-form estimates of the coeﬃcients but
does not allow to attribute observed association separately to unobserved heterogene-
ity and pure error terms because neither does the estimation relate the disturbances of
the two equations nor can we expect to get reliable estimates for the Þrm idiosyncratic
error term with only two periods.24
3.2 Data and Estimation
The data25 used in this paper is a balanced panel of 532 German plants operating in
mechanical engineering for two years, namely 1992 and 1994. It contains information
on the formal and informal organization of the plant, e.g. human resource practices,
technology choices, employee characteristics, and other strategic variables. The panel
is available for the period 1990-1997 but various items of interest are not included in
the questionnaires of all waves. Product innovation is measured as a binary variable26
INNOVATION which equals one whenever the plant had introduced new products
23The authors point out a possibly important limitation of their approach: if decisions are state
dependent (e.g. a Þrm that uses a given technology today is likely to continue to do so in the near
future) and this cannot be explicitely modeled because the panel is to short, the random Þrm eﬀect in
the adoption equation will contain some of this state dependence. Hence, excluding the part of random
variation that is idiosyncratic to the Þrm gives a tendency to overestimate unobserved heterogeneity
and bias the estimated complementarity.
24The Þrm-speciÞc time-independent part the error term can in principle be estimated. See Wa-
clawiw/Liang (1993) for a Bayesian technique.
25We would like to thank Ulrich Widmaier, University of Bochum (German National Science Foun-
dation, SFB 187) for the allowance to use this data set.
26All variable deÞnitions that appear in this sections are summarized in table 4 of appendix D for
convenience.
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and zero otherwise. The variable FLEXIBILITY equals zero if the plant adopted
conventional, numerically controlled27 (NC) or computer-numerically controlled (CNC)
machines but no more integrated technologies and it is equal to one if machining centers,
ßexible manufacturing cells (FMC) or ßexible machine systems (FMS) are installed.
The diﬀerence between the two groups is an ordering with respect to the ßexibility of
a single machine as well as with respect to the ßexibility of the entire shop ßoor.
Table 6 in appendix D contains the mean values for both variables in both years.
In 1992 roughly 46% of the Þrms had adopted the more ßexible technologies, whereas
in 1994 their number had increased to 51%. The share of Þrms that reported to engage
in product innovation on the other hand decreased from 78% to 66% during the same
period. Where the apparent raise in ßexibility might reßect a general trend towards
high capability systems, the pattern of innovation might be the result of the recession
that followed the reuniÞcation boom shortly after 1990. We report numbers for East
and West Germany separately, however, the numbers diﬀer only slightly.
Association between FLEXIBILITY and INNOVATION is measured by Kendalls
tau (τ) as deÞned in Appendix C. Contrary to the standard Pearson correlation co-
eﬃcient it captures nonlinear dependence. Unconditional on any exogenous variables
we Þnd a slightly positive but signiÞcant dependence (τ = .097, p-value .001). As
indicated above the assumptions we need to take this as evidence for complementarity
between ßexible machines and product innovation are very restrictive and we should
therefore control for plant characteristics.
As our data is a panel of only two years we capture time eﬀects by the dummy
YEAR94 which equals zero in 1992 and one in 1994. The log of the total number of
employees of the plant28 (LOGSIZE) might have an eﬀect on technology choice and
27NCs and CNCs are single-task machines with decentralized numerical control, i.e. there is no
coordination between the machines. Machining centers are also stand-alone devices but they perform
a variety of tasks. Very often they include automatic tool changing. FMC/S denote systems of a few
(FMC) or many (FMS) machines that are connected by automatic material handling and controlled
by a single, central device. See Gurisatti, Soli, Tattara (1997) for the deÞnitions.
28We use the logarithm because the original size variable is extremely skewed: Most Þrms have less
than 100 employees and only very few reach very large numbers such as several thousands.
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innovation due to many reasons, like economies of scale, size dependent coordination
costs and so forth. We further include variables that indicate whether decisions are
actually taken at the plant level: FIRMLEVEL equals one if technological or organi-
zational issues were reported to be on the Þrm-level agenda.
Because the Þrm-level inßuence may not always be directly perceived by plant
managers but still be signiÞcant we include further the variable MULTIPLANT which
equals one if the plant belongs to some multi-plant Þrm29. The share of products that
are not standardized, but the customer can add their wishes to a basic design or com-
pletely specify the design (CUSTOMIZE) is expected to positively inßuence ßexibility
whereas there is no such clear cut intuition for its eﬀect on product innovation. We
include the variable HIERARCHY in our analysis to proxy communication costs that
might hinder all sorts of changes and especially product innovation. It takes the value
one if managers reported the number of hierarchical levels on their plants to be av-
erage or more. Information on hierarchy is available for 1992 only, in the estimation
we assume it had not changed in 1994. Workers skills, which typically cannot be
freely determined in every period, might play a crucial role in the decision whether
new products are introduced to the market and on the complexity of machines a Þrm
wants to install. We try to capture this eﬀect by the share of skilled workers, foremen
and engineers in production (EDUCATION).
The theoretical part of this paper argued that the gain from ßexibility tends to
increase with demand uncertainty the Þrm faces. The bivariate variable RISK is a very
rough proxy for uncertainty as it indicates whether a crucial part of revenues is assured
by long term contracts or not. If, according to managers subjective judgement, there
are such long-term contracts, RISK is equal to zero (one otherwise).
To account for unobserved heterogeneity we estimate random eﬀects models of the
29The correlation between FIRMLEVEL and MULTIPLANT is surprisingly low (0.24).
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form
y∗it = βxit + εit
with εit = ui + vit
and ui ∼ N(0, σ2u), vit ∼ N(0, σ2v),
where y∗it and xit denote the latent endogenous and the vector of exogenous variables
of individual i at time t respectively and β is the parameter vector. The error term εit
is additively separable into an individual component that is Þxed over time (ui) and
a pure random term (vit). We assume that the variance of the disturbances has the
simple form var(εit) = σ2u + σ
2
v, i.e., ui and vit are uncorrelated.
Table 8 presents the estimates of the random-eﬀects probit models. Note Þrst that
the correlation between the disturbances over the two periods is large and highly sig-
niÞcant in both equations. This suggests that indeed unobserved heterogeneity is a
serious issue in this study. One potential source for the high magnitude of correlation
is, of course, inertia to switch technology and innovation modes that, due to the two-
period limitation of our data, we could not estimate separately. If this inertia plays the
role that intuition suggests, the extent of individual heterogeneity in our model may
be substantially overestimated. Note that the estimated correlation between the dis-
turbances of two periods is stronger in the ßexibility equation which may be caused by
the fact that sunk costs, and thus inertia, for technology are greater than for innovative
activities.
The year 1994 has a signiÞcant impact on the decision to innovate. The sign of
the coeﬃcient may be interpreted as a business cycle eﬀect in the case of innovation
and as a positive time trend for the adoption of ßexible technology as discussed above.
Plant size is signiÞcantly positively related to both, product innovation and ßexibility,
whereas decisions that are widely taken at the Þrm instead of plant level or being part
of a company with multiple plants do not signiÞcantly alter the tendency to install high
capability machines or to rework the product line. A plant that oﬀers to customize a
large part of its product line is less likely to introduce new products to the market.
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Presumably, the term new will be interpreted in diﬀerent ways by the Þrms: with
perfectly standardized products very small changes in design can be interpreted as a
new product. A customizing supplier on the other hand will deÞne product innovation
probably abstracting from minor changes in design if these are within the usual variety
and even if a given combination of features had never been created before.
Somewhat surprising, neither CUSTOMIZE has a signiÞcant eﬀect on ßexibility
nor is there any signiÞcant impact of RISK and EDUCATION. This may indicate that
the construction of these variables is not appropriate but rather constrained by the
data. Very hierarchical structures, as expected, seem to work as obstacles to product
innovation because they are likely to increase communication costs.
To assess how controlling for observed heterogeneity changed the empirical associa-
tion we now compute Kendalls tau for the generalized residuals (deÞned as in appendix
C) of the two equations. We Þnd that the relation between product innovation and
ßexible technology has decreased to only .033 and is signiÞcant only at the 10% level.
Table 3 compares the results. Note again, that the conditional association reported
there contains the part of the dependence between the two endogenous variables that
can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity, because without estimating a simulta-
neous system of equations we cannot disentangle the sources. It is not clear whether
dependence based on random eﬀects ui or on the pure noise vit have the same sign.
Hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that the association between the pure noise
of would be much larger than .033. Everything else equal the presence of strictly posi-
tively aﬃliated vector of unobserved characteristics tends to overestimate complemen-
tarity due to residual dependence. If, on the other hand, unobserved characteristics
are strictly negatively aﬃliated one might observe negative association between the
residuals of complementary decision variables. Athey and Stern (1998) give examples
for such misbehavior and demonstrate further that even if unobservable factors are
independent, omission tend to reduce testing power.
In the light of our theoretical Þndings we note that the residual correlation may also
be aﬀected by noncomplementary endogenous variables that we did not control for. For
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unconditional conditional
Kendalls tau .097 .033
p-value .001 .100
Table 3: Association between INNOVATION and FLEXIBILITY. Number of observa-
tions: 1074.
example, price increases where assumed to favor innovation due to complementarity in
the demand function but we found the impact on the gains from ßexible technology
was inconclusive.
4 Conclusion
This paper reconsiders the Þrms decision on technology and innovative activities. An
optimization model with stochastic demand is introduced which takes into account
gains from ßexibility due to a wider set of future production possibilities. Because
product innovation aﬀects demand while the degree of ßexibility sets constraints to
production the interaction between both variables is shown to be more than just a
Þxed cost issue. Our results point out that the gain from incremental innovation might
be lowered by ßexibility even though the Þxed cost of introducing a new product to
the market are decreased by ßexible machines.
As theoretical predictions are ambiguous we use empirical evidence to check whether
complementarity in the Þxed costs is strong enough to compensate potentially adverse
eﬀects in operational proÞts. For the German mechanical engineering sector there is
some slight association between innovative activities and the use of highly ßexible, IT
related machines. However, this association vanishes once observed heterogeneity is
controlled for. Although our empirical approach is in some respects simplistic and any
interpretation of the results should involve some caution, the Þndings raise doubts that
complementarity between ßexibility and product innovation is strong.
There is some room to generalize the concerns. Many applications of the theory of
technological complementarity in the context of monopolistic Þrms derived their results
mainly from Þxed cost considerations but ignored uncertainty and optimization over
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time. These two features  information that is revealed over time coupled with the
possibility that Þrms adapt to it might give some new insight to the question whether
the complementarity and monotonicity predictions based on Þxed costs considerations
really hold for overall (expected) proÞts.
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A Complementarity and Supermodular Functions
This appendix provides the deÞnition of a supermodular function and points out some
of its properties which are used in the main part of the paper. For details see Topkis
(1998).
DeÞnition 1 Suppose that f(x) is a real-valued function on a lattice X. If f(x0) +
f(x00) ≤ f(x0 ∨ x00) + f(x0 ∧ x00) for all x0 and x00 in X, then f(x) is supermodular in
x on X. Supermodularity is strict if the inequality holds strictly. For the deÞnition of
(strict) submodularity reverse the inequality symbol.
If, as in this paper,X is a sublattice of some n-dimensional product of chains, super-
modularity is equivalent to complementarity. Supermodularity on any Þnite product
of chains is equivalent to supermodularity on the product of each pair of chains and
thus can be checked pairwise in these cases.
Supermodularity is preserved by summation, multiplication with a factor and par-
tial maximization. The latter property ensures that qualitative results gained from
the inspection of a subsystem of complementary decision variables will still hold once
the whole system is considered. As supermodularity is a cardinal property, it is not
preserved by arbitrary increasing transformations.
Exogenous variables are parameters of the decision making process and may be
included in the vector x of the deÞnition above. However, to address eﬀects of monotone
changes in exogenous variables it is suﬃcient to assume that they are complements to
the endogenous variables but not necessarily complements among themselves. This
property is formalized by the notion of increasing diﬀerences:
DeÞnition 2 Let X and Ω be partially ordered sets and f(x,ω) be a real-valued func-
tion on a subset S of X × Ω For ω ∈ Ω, let Sω denote the section of S at ω. If
f(x,ω00)− f(x,ω0) is (strictly) increasing in x on Sω00
T
Sω0 for all ω0 ≺ ω00 in Ω, then
f(x,ω) has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in (x,ω) on S. Analogously, if the diﬀerence
f(x,ω00)− f(x,ω0) is (strictly) decreasing, f(x,ω) has (strictly) decreasing diﬀerences.
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Increasing diﬀerences in (x,ω) is equivalent to stating that all parameters are com-
plements to all decision variables. Twice diﬀerentiable functions exhibit increasing
diﬀerences, if and only if all cross-partial derivatives of the objective with respect to
any combination of decision variables and parameters are nonnegative.
For monotone comparative statics supermodularity and increasing diﬀerences in
conjunction with a feasible set that is increasing in the parameter are suﬃcient condi-
tions:
Theorem 1 (Topkis 1978) If X is a lattice, Ω is a partially ordered set, the sec-
tion Sω is a subset of X for each ω in Ω, Sω is increasing in ω on Ω, the func-
tion f(x,ω) is supermodular in x on X for each ω in Ω, and f(x,ω) has increas-
ing diﬀerences in (x,ω) on X × Ω, then argmaxx∈Sω f(x,ω) is increasing in ω on
{ω : ω ∈ Ω, argmaxx∈Sω f(x,ω) is nonempty}.
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) generalized theorem 1 by showing that it also holds
for the ordinal concepts of quasisupermodularity and single crossing (ordinal comple-
mentarity). Thus, the conditions of the theorem hold whenever all decision variables
are ordinal complements and all components of the parameter vector ω are ordinal
complements to the vector x. The components of ω need not be ordinal complements.
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B Proof of Proposition 1
−F (f,ω) and −γk are trivially supermodular in f and k respectively. As supermodu-
larity is preserved under summation, we have that −I(i, f,ω)− γk− F (f,ω) is super-
modular in (i, f, k).
The cross partial derivative of [(p− c)Dj(i, p)] with respect to i and p exists and is
positive because diﬀerentiability and supermodularity of Dj(i, p) imply ∂2Dj/∂i∂p ≥
0 and we assumed that ∂Dj/∂i ≥ 0. Thus [(p − c)Dj(i, p)] and 2[(p − c)Dj(i, p)]
are supermodular in (i, p). Applying the summation property again gives the Þrst
statement of the proposition.
To proof part (ii) of the proposition, note that we have assumed that every summand
of the proÞt function has increasing diﬀerences in ((i, f, k, p),ω). As these are preserved
by summation, Π exhibits increasing diﬀerences in ((i, f, k, p),ω). Together with the
Þrst part of the proposition and the fact that the set of feasible actions does not depend
on ω the conditions of monotonicity theorem (see appendix A) are met and the result
established.
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C DeÞnitions
Kendalls tau
To calculate Kendalls tau (τ) of two vectors x and y we use the following deÞnition:
τ =
c− dp
(c+ d+ tx) (c + d+ ty)
,
where c and d are the number of concordant and discordant pairs respectively and tx
(ty) denotes the number of pairs tied on x (y) but not on y (x). Values of τ lie in the
interval [−1, 1], positive (negative) values indicate positive (negative) dependence.
Generalized Residuals
The Pearson residual for a binary response model is deÞned as
ri =
yi − bπipbπi(1− bπi) ,
where y denotes the endogenous variable that can take values equal to zero or one, i
indexes the observation and bπi is the estimated probability that y = 1. Because in such
a model var(yi−bπi) 6= bπi(1−bπi) we have that var(ri) 6= 1. Pregibon (1981) developed
the standardized Pearson residual for this case
rsti =
rip
(1− hi)
,
where hi = bπi(1− bπi)xidvar(bβ)x0i and xi denotes the row vector of exogenous variables
and bβ is the estimated parameter vector. In our estimation there is practically no
diﬀerence between ri and rsti but only the latter are used for computation of Kendalls
tau.
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D Tables and Figures
Variable Description
FLEXIBILITY =1 if the plant adopted machining centers,
FMC or FMS, 0 otherwise
INNOVATION = 1 if new products were introduced, 0 otherwise
YEAR94 =1 for 1994, =0 otherwise
LOGSIZE log of total number of employees (except administrative)
FIRMLEVEL =1 if technological or organizational issues were decided
at the Þrm instead of the plant level, 0 otherwise
MULTIPLANT =1 if plant belongs to some multi-plant Þrm, 0 otherwise
CUSTOMIZE share of products that where not standardized,
but the custumer could add to a basic design
or completely specify the design
RISK =0 if an essential (for continuation of the business)
share of revenues is from long term contracts
with costumers, 1 otherwise
EDUCATION number of skilled workers, foremen and engineers
relative to total number of employees in production
HIERARCHY =0 if organizational structure is reported to be less hierarchical
than average, 1 otherwise (only available for 1992)
Table 4: Variable deÞnitions.
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
INNOVATION 0.719924812 0.449246881 0 1
RISK 0.814849624 0.388602165 0 1
FIRMLEVEL 0.202067669 0.401731262 0 1
EDUCATION 0.750329707 0.232603765 0 1
FLEXIBILITY 0.484022556 0.499979664 0 1
HIERARCHY 0.706766917 0.455458458 0 1
CUSTOMIZE 0.817937970 0.276060422 0 1
LOGSIZE 4.05922346 1.06918760 0 8.45
MULTIPLANT 0.290413534 0.454166680 0 1
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics. N=1064.
FLEXIBILITY INNOVATION
1992 1994 1992 1994
East
.3333
(.4771)
.4524
(.5038)
.3929
(.4913)
.8333
(.3772)
.6667
(.4771)
.7500
(.4356)
West
.4714
(.4997)
.5122
(.5004)
.4918
(.5002)
.7776
(.4163)
.6571
(.4751)
.7173
(.4505)
.4605
(.4989)
.5075
(.5004)
.4840
(.5000)
.7820
(.4133)
.6579
(.4749)
.7199
(.4492)
Table 6: Mean of INNOVATION and FLEXIBILITY (standard deviation in parenthe-
sis). Number of observations per year: East: 42, West: 490.
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1992 1994
East
.316∗
(.043)
.237
(.129)
.239∗
(.029)
West
.082
(.068)
.104∗
(.022)
.087∗∗
(.006)
.095∗
(.028)
.114∗∗
(.008)
.097∗∗
(.001)
Table 7: Unconditional correlation (Kendalls tau) between INNOVATION and FLEX-
IBILITY (p-value in parenthesis). Number of observations per year: East: 42, West:
490. * (**) indicates signiÞcance at the .05 (.01) level (2-tailed).
Innovation Flexibility
Coeﬃcient P-value Coeﬃcient P-value
CONSTANT .5890675881 .1405 -4.094333881*** .0000
YEAR94 -.5425365516*** .0000 .3790892066*** .0040
LOGSIZE .3516162630*** .0000 .9512584420*** .0000
FIRMLEVEL .1314831593 .4541 .5556288603E-01 .7972
MULTIPLANT .2474844253 .1442 .3010922655 .1974
CUSTOMIZE -1.575403089*** .0000 .8910673912E-01 .8102
RISK .2354568168 .1501 -.2262075791 .3236
EDUCATION .4934053273* .0865 -.1033049901E-01 .9833
HIERARCHY -.2785720441* .0693 -.4909537266E-01 .8600dcorr(εit, εis), s 6= t .4978222791*** .0000 .8348466787*** .0000
Table 8: Estimation results of random eﬀects model . ***, **, * represent signiÞcance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. ML estimates using the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm (BFGS).
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Figure 1: The impact of demand drivers and capacity on expected operational proÞts
as a function of the diﬀerence between initial capacity and demand (f = 1). The case
boundaries are calculated using equation (9). Depending on the size of δ0 the vertical
axis may shift further to the right.
43
0 µ2−k
)0()1( ~~ ** =−= ΠΠ fEfE yy
0
012 δ
δ
σ
−
−
0
0
1
2
δ
δ
σ
−00
0
)1(
12
δδ
δ
σ
−
−
IIIIIa IIbI
Figure 2: Expected gain from ßexibility in the production period as a function of µ
and k. A price increase shifts the graphs upwards (dotted lines). The case boundaries
are calculated using equation (9). Depending on the size of δ0 the vertical axis may
shift further to the right.
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